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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Aldon

J.

Anderson, Judge

.JACKSON B. HOWARD, for:
HOWARD AND LEWIS
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
JAMES P. COWLEY, for
PUGSLEY, HAYES,
CAMPBELL AND CO\VLt6
Suite 400 El Paso Natural
J
Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
__

LED
.·, .. _,.,,.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -----------------------------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ----------------------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S EXPERT MEDICAL WITNESS TO
TESTIFY AS TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT
PLAINTIFF MURL CHRISTIANSON'S SYMPTOMS WERE CAUSED BY A PREEXISTING
CONDITION.
Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66,
210 Pd 929 ( 1922). ----------------------------------------·------------------- 4
"Expert and Opinion Evidence",

§

44, 31 Am. Jur. 2d

548 ( 1967). ----------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 167
A.2d 96, 89 A.L.R2d 1166 ( 1961). --------------------------

4

Moore V. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255,
292 P.2d 849 ( 1956). ----------------------------------------------------

4

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

JACK CHRISTIANSON and
.MURL CHRISTIANSON,

Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.

Case No.
11685

JOANNE DEBRY,

Defendant and Respondent
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage caused by the negligence of the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court found defendant negligent as
a matter of law and entered judgment on a jury verdict in the amount of $3,500.00. The Court denied
plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, which motion was
based primarily on the same ground raised here on
appeal, i.e., error in the admission of certain testimony
by defendant's expert witness, Dr. Allred.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs request that this Honorable Court grant
them a new trial on the issue of damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the course of the trial the court allowed
counsel for defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs'
counsel, to question defendant's expert witness, Dr.
Allred, as follows :

Q. (By Mr. Cowley) Considering the na-

ture of the degenerative disk disease you have
observed in :Mrs. Christianson, I want to ask if
you have an opinion as to whether or not that
condition could account for the headaches.
A. Yes, it could.
Q. Do you have an opinion?
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I am
going to object to the question on the basis it
"could" because "could" is not the proper question to ask of the witness if he is asking an opinion because we are not interested in possibilities.
Q. (By l\fr. Cowley) I'll ask you again
Doctor if you have an opinion within the degree
of medical probability that that condition could
cause the headaches.
MR. HOWARD: I make the same objection.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled.
l\1R. HO\VARD: Your Honor, he has used
the word "could".
l\1IR. CO\VLEY: I said within the degree
of medical probability.
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THE COURT: It is a matter of weight for
the .Jury. The objection is overruled.
THE WITNESS: Within the degree of
medical probability it can cause headaches.
Q. (By Mr. Cowley) \iVithin the degree
of medical probability can it cause the soreness
or stiffness of the neck?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. HO\V ARD: May I have a continuing
objection to that?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You may.
MR. HOWARD: To the manner in which
this question is framed. I think it is objectionable.
THE COURT: You may. (R. 211)
On two occasions, in chambers, prior to submitting
the case to the jury, the plaintiff requested a special
instruction for the jury to disregard the objectionable
testimony. This request was not recorded in the record,
but the plaintiff believes the defendant will not dispute
the request having been made.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S
EXPERT MEDICAL WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS TO THE
POSSIBILITY

THAT

PLAINTIFF

MURL

CHRISTIAN-

SON'S SYMPTOMS WERE CAUSED BY A PREEXISTING
CO:\fDITION.

It is a well-established rule of law that "an ex-
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pert's opm1on, if not stated m terms of the certain
'
must at least be stated in terms of the probable, and
not merely of the possible." 31 Am.J ur.2d 548, "Expert
and Opinion Evidence'', § 44 ( 1967).
In Moore v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. Co., 4 Utah
2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 ( 1956) expert testimony was allowed by the trial court to the effect that "it was possible that the accident initiated the condition" of nerve
irritation and consequent disabilty for whch plaintiff
might recover. 4 Utah 2d 257, 292 P.2d 880. The Supreme Court held that "since no affirmative evidence
was offered on this issue" the speculative testimony of
the witness, together with his "learned and convincing
discourse on ruptured discs·' made it likely that the
jury would consider the disputed point as proven and
that "therefore, an instruction should have been given
to cure a possible prejudice." 4 Utah 2d 259, 292 P.2d
851.
To the same effect is Chief Consol. Min. Co. v.
Salisbury, 61 Utah 66,210 P. 929 (1922) in which the
court held insufficient to support liability testimony of
an expert witness to the effect that the accident in
question "might" have accelerated the diseased condition of the plaintiff's heart and hastened his death.
Cf. Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 .Md. 195,
167 A.2d 96, 89 A.L.R. 2d 1166 (1961): "The rulings
of this court ha\·e been consistent in holding that an
expert witness must base his opinion on probability and
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not on mere possibility." 89 A.L.R. 2d 1173.
The questions of defendant's counsel clearly called
for conclusions by the expert witness as to "possibility"
rather than "probability" that the plaintiff's injuries
were caused by a pre-existing condition. Dr. Allred
testified not that the condition "did" or "probably did"
cause plaintiff's headaches, but only that it "could" have
done so. The assertion that cause A "could have" or
"can" produce effect B is clearly the grammatical
equivalent of an assertion that B "possibly" follows from
A. The mere prefacing of a question with the formula,
"within a degree of medical probability," could, etc,
does not convert such speculative testimony given in
response thereto into an assertion that the causal connection is "probable".
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CONCLUSION
It follows from the foregoing that allowing the
objectionable testimony to go to the jury was prejudical
error and that plaintiffs' motion for new trial should
be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Jackson B. Howard, for:
HOWARD AND LEWIS
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 8401
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
to James P. Cowley, Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss, Campbell and Cowley, Suite 400 El Paso Natural Gas Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ________ day of
July, 1969.

